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SUMMARYIt is now 20 years since the Single Market Programme was launched
with the goal of eliminating barriers to the movement of goods, services, capi-
tal and people. Over this period the EU has made substantial progress through
a truly impressive legislative effort. But in the process have Europeans really
become more “European”? While large industries have embraced the opportu-
nities of the Single Market to become more international in outlook, Europeans
basically continue to shop, invest and work at home.  And though equity mar-
kets are still making progress, the integration of product markets appears to
have stalled, and  labour remains largely fragmented.   
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Despite the improvements in integration of
European markets, home bias remains high.
While there was a fall in home bias in equity
markets during 2001-2003 not much has
changed in product markets. This adds weight
to the argument that traditional internal mar-
ket policies may have had their day and it is
time for a rethink. Policies for the 21st century
must adapt to an increasingly service-oriented
and innovation-driven economy. The focus
should be on favouring entry and competi-
tion, facilitating the diffusion of innovation,
and creating conditions for a further inte-
gration of the value chains across Europe.
Reforms should also aim to reduce the
imbalances in integration across countries
and across markets. A single currency can-
not deliver without a Single Market.
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THE Single Market Programme
(SMP) was launched in the mid-
80s with the aim of enhancing
growth and competitiveness in
Europe through the creation of an
area without internal frontiers allo-
wing the “free movement of goods,
persons, services and capital”. 
The end result should have been a
more integrated Europe in which
“home countries” were less rele-
vant in consumers’, investors’ and
workers’ decisions.   
But 20 years later, national borders
still matter and there is widespread
disillusion about what further pro-
gress can be expected. Some
observers dismiss integration
efforts as pointless and claim that
nations are here to stay. Others
argue that the economic model
underpinning the SMP is exhausted
and that a new approach to market
integration is needed.
1
In spite of international specialisa-
tion and outsourcing, countries’
consumption baskets and invest-
ment portfolios still contain a pre-
dominant share of domestically
produced products and domestic
assets (not to mention the predo-
minance of national-born workers
in national labour markets). This is
commonly known as the “home
bias puzzle” (see Box 1). Market
integration policies aim at remo-
ving those obstacles that prevent
mobility of products, capital and
people across borders. One sign of
success would be more consump-
tion of foreign goods, a rise in
foreign assets in investment port-
folios, and an increase in foreign
workers in national labour markets. 
But just what would a fully integra-
ted economy look like? This policy
brief assesses in a simple way the
extent to which economic deci-
sions have become less domestic
and more European by looking at
the evolution of “home bias” in
consumption, investment and
labour decisions. The same metho-
dology is applied to product and
equity markets, which allows the
comparison of results across coun-
tries and across markets. The ana-
lysis complements the previous
issue of this series (Véron, 2006)
which examined the meaning of
“home” for European businesses.
Section 1 presents a number of
indicators for home bias and analy-
ses how the EU15 compare to
other countries according to these
indicators. Section 2 looks at some
explanations for home bias and
examines its evolution and econo-
mic consequences. Finally, section
3 provides some policy recommen-
dations.
1. MEASURING HOME BIAS
We define “home bias” as the
excessive consumption or absorp-
tion of domestically produced pro-
ducts, or excessive investment in
domestic equity compared with
two theoretical benchmarks.
  In the first one (a “Frictionless
Economy”
2), the share of a country
in any consumption basket is
determined by the size of its eco-
nomy. This definition assumes that
in the absence of home bias consu-
mers have equal access to and no
preferences for goods or assets
from any part of the world.
Therefore, the amount of products
and assets from each country is
determined by the share of that
country in the world production
and market capitalisation respecti-
vely.
A limitation of the first benchmark
is that it ignores the role of dis-
tance. Hence, it assumes that only
Australia’s weight in OECD produc-
tion should determine the share of
Australian-produced products in,
say Hungarian total consumption.
This is obviously extreme. 
   The second benchmark (an
“Integrated Economy”
3) recognises
the role of distance. It is based on
actual trade data (which implicitly
BOX 1
THE ‘HOME BIAS PUZZLE’
The inability of economic theory to explain the empirical observation that consumers over-purchase domestically
produced goods and services and investors over-invest in domestic equity is known as the “home bias puzzle”.
The attempts to quantify and explain the “home bias puzzle” are pervasive in recent economic literature.
McCallum (1995) first estimated that the trade between Canadian provinces is 20 times greater than the trade
between border US states and Canadian provinces, even if there were no substantial barriers to trade. Nitsch
(2000) estimates that on average EU countries trade internally 7 to 10 times more that with partner countries
(after adjustment for size, distance and other variables). Equally, for asset holdings, Portes and Rey (2005)
quantify the size and determinants of financial home bias. However, the explanation and policy implications of
the existence of home bias are not fully convincing in the literature. Recent literature has explored the links bet-
ween trade and financial markets (see e.g. Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2000) in order to explain home bias in financial
markets. Frictions in product markets could be responsible not only for home bias in product markets but also for
the excessive home bias in equity markets that otherwise would not be consistent with the current degree of glo-
balisation of financial markets. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004) offer empirical evidence of this link. Finally, most
recent literature finds that incomplete contracts between final goods producers and intermediate suppliers, and
lack of a common institutional setting, could play an important role in explaining home bias (Antras, 2003).
1See the European
Commission public
consultation on the
Future of the Internal
Market at
http://ec.europa.eu/inte
rnal_market/strategy/in
dex_en.htm.
2For example, as
Germany accounts for
9% of OECD production,
German products
should weight 9% in
each consumption bas-
ket in the absence of
home bias. In reality,
German products
account for 85% of
German consumption.
The home bias there-
fore amounts to 76 per-
centage points (85%
minus 9%).
3For example, using
data on bilateral trade
with other countries it
is estimated that
Germany would import
12% of its total
consumption from a
country equal in size
and distance. The cur-
rent share of domestic
products in consump-
tion in Germany is 85%.
The home bias using
this benchmark is the-
refore 73% (i.e. 85%
minus 12%).SINGLE MARKET TRAILS HOME BIAS
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4The distance of a coun-
try to itself converges
to zero when its size
diminishes. It increases
with the geographical
size of the country.
5For example, both
assume that all pro-
ducts in the economy
are fully tradable. This
assumption, although
unrealistic, provides a
benchmark for the
limits of integration.
6The share varies howe-
ver from country to
country e.g. while the
share of imports from
OECD countries in total
imports is between 80
and 85 percent in most
EU states, it is around
60 percent in the US
and 40 percent in
Japan.
EUROPEANS SHOP LOCALLY
Europeans have a strong bias for
goods and services produced
within the EU. Of all the OECD pro-
ducts consumed in the EU15, 96%
come from the EU15. The weight of
nationally-produced goods and
services in domestic demand is
similar in the US.
The key question, however, is how
much EU15 countries trade among
themselves. The answer is: Not a
great deal. On
average, an EU15
country spends
86% on national
products, 10% on
products from
other EU15 coun-
tries and 4% on
products from
other OECD countries (Chart 1 in
Fig. 1). 
The first benchmark ignores geo-
graphic distance, as would be
appropriate in a “Frictionless
Economy” (Chart 2 in Fig. 1). As
the EU15 countries’ share of
domestic products is well above
their share in OECD production,
they appear to be highly home bia-
sed. By contrast, the US which
accounts for close to 45% of OECD
production appears to be much
less home biased. The same is
actually true, though to a lesser
extent, for the EU as a whole,
whose home bias is only 60%. 
Introducing geographic distance
generally reduces the home bias of
EU countries but does not remove
it (Chart 3 in Fig. 1). Trade within
the typical EU country remains
much higher than one would
expect in an “Integrated Economy”
and trade among them, or with the
rest of the world, much lower.
Distance also changes the picture
for the US, however in the opposite
way: it now appears to be more
home biased than the countries of
the EU.
reflects existing obstacles to
trade) and defines a country’s
home bias as the difference bet-
ween what it trades with itself and
what it would trade with a country
of similar size and distance.
4
The two benchmarks can be calcu-
lated in a similar way for equity
holdings. (See Box 2 for formulae.)
Neither of the benchmarks is per-
fect and they involve a number of
caveats.
5 The first one is
more straightforward but
lacks realism. The second
is closer to reality but
depends on estimated
parameters. 
We use OECD countries as a
reference for integration.
The aim of taking such a broader
sample is to analyze whether there
are differences in integration bet-
ween EU members and other coun-
tries. Intra-OECD imports account
for 70 % of total OECD imports.
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Chart 1
Domestic products in domestic demand 
Fig. 1
Home Bias in Product Markets (%)  (2003)
Chart 2
Frictionless Economy Benchmark 
Chart 3 
Integrated Economy Benchmark
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Source: Bruegel estimates based on OECDand CEPII. SE, ES and NL (2002 data). OECD excluding Australia, New
Zealand, Korea, Ireland, Iceland, Poland, Slovak Republic, Switzerland and Turkey. EU15 excluding Ireland.
‘Of all the OECD
products consumed
in the EU15, 96%
come from the EU15.’b
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SINGLE MARKET TRAILS HOME BIAS
Chart 1
Domestic Equity in Equity Holdings
Fig. 2
Home Bias in Equity Markets (%) (2003)
Chart 2
Frictionless Economy Benchmark
Chart 3 
Integrated Economy Benchmark
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7Austria and Italy are
amongst the smallest
financial markets in the
EU, what to some
extent might explain
their higher investment
in foreign assets.
On a country-by-country basis,
home bias is generally lower in
core EU15 countries (Netherlands,
Belgium, Austria and Germany)
than in the periphery (Greece, Italy,
Spain, Nordic countries). 
Amongst new member states, the
Czech Republic and
Hungary have a lower
degree of home bias
than the EU15 average,
which reflects the
increasing integration
of these countries with
Western Europe.
In conclusion, home
bias remains very large
in the EU and it is simi-
lar to other OECD coun-
tries when we account for country
size and distance. 
EUROPEANS INVEST AT HOME
Europeans also invest heavily in
the EU15: 83% of their equity
wealth is invested within the EU15
which is slightly lower than the
share Americans invest within the
US.
The average EU15 country invests
around 65% of its equity wealth at
home, 18% in other EU15 countries
and 17% in other OECD
countries. On average,
EU15 countries invest at
home less than OECD
countries, which invest
domestically 80% of their
equity wealth (Chart 1 in
Fig. 2). 
In a “Frictionless
Economy” (Chart 2 in Fig.
2), once again since EU15
countries’ market capitali-
sation is small, their home bias
appears high. The US, even though
it invests more than EU countries
at home, appears less home biased
than the typical EU15 country
since it accounts for half of the
total OECD market capitalisation.
Home bias of the EU as a whole is
around 58%.
Distance in the case of equity hol-
dings is a proxy for transaction and
especially information costs.
Introducing distance into the pic-
ture does not affect the home bias
of EU countries much(Chart 3 in
Fig. 2). However, it does change
the picture for the US, which now
appears to be much more home
biased than the average EU coun-
try.
Within the EU there are large asym-
metries in the degree of diversifica-
tion: holdings of domestic equity
range from 41% in Austria to 93% in
Greece. Austria, Belgium, Italy,
Sweden and Germany  invest the
least in domestic equity
7 while
Greece and Spain invest heavily in
domestic equity. New Member
States’ equity wealth is mainly
domestic.
Source: Bruegel estimates based on IMF CPIS, Eurostat and CEPII. OECD excluding Korea, Turkey, New Zealand,
Ireland, Luxembourg, Iceland, Netherlands and Portugal. EU15 excluding Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands and
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‘Home bias in
the EU is similar
to other  OECD
countries when
we account for
country size and
distance.’SINGLE MARKET TRAILS HOME BIAS
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Home bias in product markets has
not substantially changed over the
past few years (Fig. 3).
Unfortunately, long enough series
including services are not availa-
ble. However, if we look only at
goods (Fig. 4) we see that home
bias in the EU decreased substan-
tially between the mid-90s and
2000 but the momentum decrea-
sed afterwards. In fact, intra-EU
trade in goods grew faster than
GDP between the mid-90s and
2000, but it stalled in early 2000. 
While significant, the
effect of the Single Market
on trade in goods – as well
as those of overall liberali-
sation – has thus not been
sustained enough to com-
pensate the move to a
more service-based eco-
nomy. Therefore, home
bias in product markets
has remained stable in the
last few years.
In equity markets, however, home
Home bias in holdings of domestic
equity by EU countries is lower
than in trade but still large if one
takes into account that the costs of
investing abroad are much lower
than the costs of goods and servi-
ces trade. 
EUROPEANS DO NOT TRAVEL TO WORK
The same methodology can be
used for assessing home bias on
the labour market but the results
are not very informative since the
geographical mobility of labour is
very low in Europe. This applies not
only cross border but also within-
countries, especially compared to
the US. 
The share of Europeans working in
an EU country different to their
home country is less than two per
cent. Given the low mobility of wor-
kers, the ranking of countries
according to any home bias indica-
tor would be determined by the
size of the country.
Fig. 3
Home bias(%) in product markets in an 
Integrated Economy: US vs EU15
2000 2001 2002 2003
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BOX 2
METHODOLOGY
This policy brief uses two indicators of home bias arrived at by comparing the share of consumption of domestic
products (investment in domestic equity) in total consumption (total investment) by nationals with two bench-
marks derived from two alternative definitions of (absence of) home bias.
Under the first definition, a “Frictionless Economy”, the benchmarks are constructed as follows:
Under the second definition, an “Integrated Economy”, using data on current trade (or investment) we estimate the
impact of distance and economic size on trade, On this basis we can calculate how much a country would import from (or
invest in) a partner of equal economic and geographic size. This amount is equivalent to the demand for domestic pro-
ducts in the absence of home bias. The second benchmark would therefore be:
See www.bruegel.org for data sources and detailed methodology.
Source: Bruegel estimates based
on OECD. EU15 Excluding Ireland.
B1 Domestic Production 
Total OECD Production
= Product Markets
B1 Market Capitalisation 
Total OECD Market Cap.
= Equity Holdings
B2  Estimated Demand Domestic Products (no Home Bias) 
Total Domestic Demand
= Product Markets
B2  Estimated Holdings of Domestic Equity (no Home Bias) 
Total DomesticEquity Investment
= Equity Holdings
2.WHAT IS WRONG WITH
HOME BIAS?
Summing up, Europeans work,
mostly shop, and even to a large
extent invest at home. Despite the
process of European integration,
the degree of home bias in the
three markets remains considera-
ble. 
But are things changing as a
consequence of the Single Market
Programme?  Not much. SINGLE MARKET TRAILS HOME BIAS
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8The latest indicators
produced by the ECB
show increasing inte-
gration in the equity
market both by using
price- and quantity-
based indicators.
bias has decreased substantially
in the recent years (see Fig. 5). The
preference for home companies
stocks remains probably higher
than what can be explained by
information asymmetries, but
change is without doubt under
way.
8
The evidence therefore is that (a)
national borders still matter (b)
their importance varies considera-
bly from country to country and
(c) while there is momentum in
financial markets, it has stalled in
product markets and has barely
started in labour markets.
WHERE DOES HOME BIAS COME
FROM?
It is difficult to disentangle the
extent to which home bias is due to
non-policy reasons. Consumers
might have different preferences
and some products are not easily
tradable at long distance. Some,
such as public services, are not tra-
ded at all. Moreover, if firms decide
to produce in the destination mar-
kets, foreign trade is replaced by
local production and, in this case,
home bias in trade would produce a
misleading indicator of market
integration. Also, the increasing
weight of services in the economy,
which in principle are less tradable
than goods, makes economies in
general less exposed to trade. 
In the case of equity holdings,
information and the “familiarity”
effect (i.e. the fact that investors
over-invest in companies which
are best known to them) play an
important role. Furthermore, imper-
fect integration of product markets
tends to weaken
integration of
financial mar-
kets.
This is why
there is evi-
dence of home
bias even within
the United
States. On ave-
rage the internal
flow of trade
within US states
is three times higher than the trade
between US states. US citizens also
disproportionately invest in stocks
of companies headquartered in
their home region. However, the EU
is not as integrated as the US. After
controlling for size and distance,
trade between US states is still two
to three times higher than trade
between EU member states (Wolf,
2000).
Progress in communication and
information technologies allows for
an increase in the tradability of
goods and services and facilitates
the internationalisation of produc-
tion chains. Increasing trade of pro-
ducts that were previously not tra-
dable and higher intra-industry
trade should have boosted trade.
Home bias should therefore
decrease naturally as a conse-
quence of technological progress
and the increased potential for
trade. However, this has not happe-
ned within the EU.
WHERE ARE THE MEMBER STATES?
The degree of home bias in product
markets and equity holding varies
significantly from country
to country. Table 1 shows
home bias in product mar-
kets and equity holdings in
the EU using the integrated
economy benchmark. The
comparison only includes
those countries for which
comparable data are availa-
ble. The EU15 average home
bias is set as a reference.
According to this indicator,
Belgium and Austria are
less home biased both in equity
holdings and consumption than
the EU15 average. On the other
end, Greece and Spain are very
home-biased with reference to the
EU15 average in both mar-
kets.
The Nordic countries,
Germany and Italy have rela-
tively large home bias in
consumption and fairly diver-
sified portfolio holdings. In
the case of Italy this could be
explained by the small size of
its equity market in compari-
son to its economic size.
Source: Bruegel estimates based on OECD.
Fig. 4
EU15: Home Bias in Goods in a 
Frictionless Economy (%)
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Fig. 5
Home bias(%) in Equity in an 
Integrated Economy: US vs EU15
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Source: Bruegel estimates based on IMF CPIS,
& Eurostat. EU15 excluding IE, LU, NL and PT.
‘The EU is not as inte-
grated as the US.
Trade between US
states is two to three
times higher than
trade between EU
member states.’SINGLE MARKET TRAILS HOME BIAS
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Finally, the two new Member
States in the sample, Hungary and
Czech Republic, have rapidly inte-
grated their product markets but
their equity portfolios remain lar-
gely local.  
Source: Bruegel estimates based on OECD, IMF CPIS, & Eurostat.
tating outsourcing and increasing
the tradability of goods and servi-
ces. 
The Single Market is not an idea of
the past. But the strategy needs
rethinking and a new impetus. The
programme launched in the 1980s
relied on the assumption that
gains would come from economies
of scale as fewer plants would pro-
duce for a bigger market. It largely
downplayed market entry and the
churning effect of competition. It
also overlooked the possibility of
outsourcing and offshoring, which
were uncommon at that time. It
focused on the ove-
rall effect of market
unification, disre-
garding the poten-
tially enabling effect
of key sectors.
Internal market poli-
cies for the 21st
century should
focus on favouring
entry and competi-
tion, facilitating the
diffusion of innova-
tion, and creating
conditions for a further integration
of the value chains across Europe.
This is not only achieved through
horizontal policies but also through
policies targeted at those sectors
which help reduce trade costs and
increase tradability. Some key
examples in this respect are trans-
port, infrastructure, banking and
retail trade.
REDUCE ASYMMETRIES
Reducing market integration
asymmetries both within and
across countries should also be a
clear objective in order to enhance
the efficiency of macroeconomic
policies. Within the euro area,
exchange rates and interest rates
are no longer available to tackle the
consequences of asymmetric
shocks. Therefore, in order to make
sure that monetary policy res-
ponds effectively to the needs of
the economy it is important that
countries make progress in the
process of integration. A single cur-
rency cannot deliver without a sin-
gle market. 
Insufficient integration
may also hinder further
market reforms. A country
introducing reforms in a
specific product market
might achieve lower prices
but also higher real inte-
rest rates, since monetary
policy is not likely to res-
pond to changes in one
country. This would
increase the cost of capi-
tal and would therefore
mitigate the potential impact of
reforms. The fact that price levels in
the euro area have not converged
since the end of the nineties might
be a reflection of this phenomenon. 
Asymmetries within countries can
also involve risks, especially when
product markets are more open
than financial markets. For exam-
ple, Hungary and the Czech
Republic are relatively open to
trade, but hold most of their equity
wealth in domestic assets. This
makes their economies especially
vulnerable to shocks in their pro-
duct markets. A loss in competiti-
veness of their domestic industry
would be immediately translated
into their financial markets, increa-
sing the effect of the shock in the
country’s wealth. Nowadays,
equity markets in new member
states, although rapidly growing,
HOME BIAS IN EQUITY HOLDINGS
LOW MEDIUM HIGH
HOME
BIAS
IN  
PRODUCT  
MARKETS 
LOW AT, BE
MEDIUM DE, SE UK, DK HU, CZ
HIGH IT FI, FR GR, ES
Table 1
3. POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS
The SMP has removed many obsta-
cles on the way to European inte-
gration. However, while the integra-
tion of financial markets is still
making good progress, the integra-
tion of product markets shows
signs of exhaustion despite the
fact that the home bias measures
presented in this policy brief show
that it still has considerable poten-
tial.
A NEW APPROACH TO SINGLE
MARKET POLICIES
In this context the review of the
Single Market policies that the
European Commission has recently
launched is a timely initiative. The
traditional approach to achieving
integration through the removal of
non-tariff barriers and sectoral har-
monisation has manifestly lost
steam. Furthermore, the economic
context has substantially changed
in the last twenty years and policies
should adapt to a new environment.
Services have increased their role in
the economy, innovation has
become a major driver of economic
development, and technology plays
a much more important role in facili-
‘The Single Market
strategy needs
rethinking and a
new impetus.’quences for the reform of other
markets.
However, reforms in the product
market might also be hindered in
anticipation of the potential
effects in other markets: This was
for example the case of the contro-
versial Services Directive where
the possible effects on labour mar-
kets played an important role on its
watering down.
In order to fully exploit the syner-
SINGLE MARKET TRAILS HOME BIAS
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9See Blanchard and
Giavazzi, 2003.
10See Obstfeld and
Rogoff, 2000
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are underdeveloped and quoted
equity is neither an important
source of funding for firms nor an
important savings instrument.
Therefore, the impact of a shock on
wealth would be limited at present.
However, the pattern of equity hol-
ding needs to transform as finan-
cial wealth develops in the new
member states.
FOSTERING REFORM
Recent economic analysis emphasi-
ses the complementarity between
reforms. It suggests that reforming
product markets facilitates reforms in
labour markets
9 and reduces home
bias in equity holdings
10. Liberalising
product markets reduces the rents
enjoyed by firms and therefore crea-
tes pressure for the introduction of
more flexibility in labour markets.
Equally, more competition makes
profits more volatile and increases
the need for a more diversified portfo-
lio in order to hedge the higher risk. 
Thus, the slow down of  product
market reforms has direct conse-
gies between financial, product
and labour market reforms, such
reforms need to take into account
the links between the three mar-
kets. They must also tackle simul-
taneously all affected markets,
without expecting that reform in
one market will automatically leve-
rage reform in the others.
The current momentum of financial
integration and reform could cer-
tainly help reform in other fields.
But financial integration can
hardly continue advancing if there
is no progress in product and
labour markets. The current imba-
lances in the progress of integra-
tion make the whole process fra-
gile and undermines the ability of
the EU to make the most of one of
its greatest achievements – the
Single Market.
The author wants to thank Narcissa
Balta for her excellent research assis-
tance and fruitful discussions in the
preparation of this policy brief.
‘Financial integration
can not continue
advancing if there is no
progress on other
fronts.’